Vietnam. Inside story. What happened at Buon Ea Nao?

Here's something interesting.

Here are two accounts of a US Special Forces operation inside Viet Nam. One is from Vietnam Studies. U.S. Army Special Forces 1961-1971, a book published by the US Dept of the Army in 1973; the other is by Burchett's book, published in 1963.

The operation was at a village called Buon Ea Nao in Burchett, but Buon Enao by the Army.

Here is a map from the Army book (p20), credited to 1964. I've circled the area in question, in what Burchett calls the "Tay Nguyen (Western Highlands)" "Dak Lak province" (p153), "Ban Mé Thout district" (p157). Note, Dak Lak was referred to as Darlac by the Americans.

According to Burchett, B.M. Thout was "a center for the biggest concentration of ethic minorities in South Vietnam, mainly the Rhade, Jarai and M'Nong tribespeople." The Army book discusses the Rhade in particular, calling them "the most influential and strategically located of the Montagnard tribes in the highlands of Vietnam. Mainly centered around the village of Ban Me Thuot in Darlac Province."

Montagnard is a holdover from the French occupation of Viet Nam. Translated as 'people of the mountains' it seems to act as the American term Indian as a catch-all for a diverse group of indigenous peoples.

THE NEW PROGRAM AT BUON EA NAO

The Army Account (pg 24-25)

The Buon Enao Experiment

With the permission of the Vietnamese government, the U.S. Mission in the fall of 1961 approached the Rhade tribal leaders with a proposition that offered them weapons and training if they would declare for the South Vietnamese government and participate in a village self-defense program. All programs that affected the Vietnamese and were advised and supported by the U.S. Mission were supposed to be accomplished in concert with the Vietnamese government. In the case of the Montagnard program, however, it was agreed that the project would at first be carried out separately instead of coming under the command and control of the Vietnamese Army and its advisers, the U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group. There was no assurance that the experiment with the Rhade would work, especially in the light of the Vietnam government's failure to follow through on other promises to the Montagnards.

The village of Buon Enao, which had a population of approximately 400 Rhade, was visited in late October of 1961 by a representative of the U.S. Embassy and a Special Forces medical sergeant. During two weeks of daily meeting with village leaders to explain and discuss the program, several facts emerged. Because government forces had been unable to protect the villagers many of them supported the Viet Cong through fear. The tribesmen had previously aligned themselves with the government, but its promises of help had failed to materialize. The Rhade opposed the land development program because the resettlement took tracts of tribal lands and because most American and Vietnamese aid went to the Vietnamese villages. Finally, the discontinuance of the medical aid and educational projects by the Vietnamese government on account of the activities of the Viet Cong had created resentment against both the Viet Cong and the government.

The villagers agreed to take certain steps to show their support for the government and their willingness to co-operate. They would build a fence to enclose Buon Enao as a protection and as a visible sign to others that they had chosen to participate in the new program. They would also dig shelters within the village where women and children could take refuge in case of an attack; construct housing for a training center and for a dispensary to handle the promised medical aid; and establish an intelligence system to control movement into the village and provide early warning of attack.

In the second week of December when these tasks had been completed, the Buon Enao villagers, armed with crossbows and spears, publicly pledged that no Viet Cong would enter their village or receive assistance of any kind. At the same time fifty volunteers from a nearby village were brought in and began training as a local security or strike force to protect Buon Enao and the immediate area. With the security of Buon Enao established, permission was obtained from the Darlac Province chief to extend the program to forty other Rhade villages within a radius of ten to fifteen kilometers of Buon Enao. The chiefs and subchiefs of these villages went to Buon Enao for training in village defense. They too were told that they must build fences around their respective villages and declare their willingness to support the government of the Republic of Vietnam.

Burchett's Account (pg 156 - 159)

[Note: Below, 'Diem' and the 'Diemists' refer to Ngo Dinh Diem. Diem was Prime Minister under the French created government of the emporer Bao Dai when the French withdrew from Viet Nam after the Geneva accords of 1954. Diem declared the south a sovereign state, expressly forbidden by the accords, and was its president from 1955 to 1963 when he was assassinated after a military coup by some of his generals.]

…according to the plan [previously captured by guerilla attacks on outposts], the "agricultural settlements" were to be brought under control again and the inmates as well as the tribespeople in the "strategic hamlets" would be armed to defend themselves against the "Viet Cong." These were the new instructions which came with direct U.S. intervention at the end of 1961.

'New' Americans

Buon Ea Nao … was selected as the main camp for concentrating the minorities and instructing them in the use of U.S. weapons. Every village was supposed to send its elders for political indoctrination and ten able-bodied men for military training to protect themselves against "wild beasts." Ybih Aleo, the most authoritative leader of the 37 minority groups in the Tay Nguyen and himself from B. M. Thout district, a grizzled and grey French-trained military veteran and vice president of the NFL, told me that the Diemists, under specific U.S. advice, avoided saying they were to be armed against the Liberation Front or "Viet Cong" because they know any derogatory remarks would have alienated the tribespeople. "It was above all a U.S. officer in priest's clothing who spoke and said the weapons were against 'intruders' who came to steal their pigs or chickens, even if these were 'Diemist troops.' It was a clever line," Ybih Aleo said, "and it took into account the fact that the Diemist trops were completely discredited because of their atrocities against the people."

I heard a more detailed account from an elder of one of the villages; neither the name nor village can be revealed because he is still there and his village is now under Saigon control. A fine figure, he chose his words with great deliberation.

"This American spoke Rhade and called himself Eay (Father) Teo. He said he was a 'new' American and the the 'new' Americans were against the 'old' Americans who helped the Diemists hurt our people. 'We will help you become really independent,' he said. 'But you must not help either the Diemists or the "Viet Cong." We will give you everything you need and you will come into new homes we will help build. Cloth, rice, salt, bicycles, and arms to defend yourselves against any evildoer—we will give you all these.' We were confused. We knew the Americans helped Diem; now others come and say they oppose him. This 'new' American looked just like the 'old' ones. He seemed to be a military man but was dressed like a French priest. But he said he was not a priest. 'I am sent by Christ to help you but mine is the 'new' religion of the 'new' Americans.'

" ' You see,' said the Eay Teo, 'it is this way. The "old" Americans and the "Diemists" behave like cats. The "Viet Cong" is the mouse. If the mouse smuggles itself into your paddy, the cats come to kill the mouse. But in doing this they also harm your paddy. But if you block the mouse coming into your paddy, you can block the cat also. Then no harm will be done by cat or mouse. We will give you weapons to deal with both.'

"Our people talked this over but we were all suspicious. We did not want to be concentrated; we did not want their weapons. So we said, no concentration and no weapons. We have always defended ourselves till now in the old way. Eay Teo was very angry. 'If you refuse to take arms and the "old" Americans and Diemists come to kill you, it is your own fault,' he said. In a few days more than a thousand troops came to our area. Five villages were burned and 20 people, mainly children and old people, were killed. Our tribespeople were ordered to go to B.M. Thout again and to be ready to accept concentration. We were over a thousand who assembled and our hearts were heavy. Diemist troops surrounded us with their arms pointed at our backs. Eay Teo was there, the governor of the province and the chiefs of all the districts. 'Either you agree to concentrate immediately or the trouups will be sent against all your villages tomorrow,' said Eay Teo.

"We were all sad. Everyone looked at the ground for there seemed no hope. But then the old man, I Bru of Buon Dju village, climbed onto the platform of a hut and started to speak. He was old, nearly 70, but everyone knew him: 'We tribespeople,' he said, 'always lived with our ray [crops], our forests and brooks and tres. Now you want to lock us up, away from our trees and forests. In that case we will slowly die. Now you have your troops and guns around us. Better pull the trigers now so we die all together.' The district chief strode up to him: 'If you disagree with the government, the Americans, you old fool, you will all be killed. And if you continue to speak like that you will b e killed first, now.'

" 'If you are killed,' shouted old man I Bru, 'you lose your villa, your plantation, your fine car, your beautiful women. If I am killed, I lose this only,' and he snatched off his loin cloth, threw it in the face of the district chief and stood there naked, his chest thrust out to receive the bullets. There was tremendous excitement. Everyone rushed forward to save the old man, shouting, 'No concentration! No concentration!' Officials were swept off their feet and the soldiers made their guns ready. Then Eay Teo spoke up again, trying to smile but his lips were twisted. 'Why all the noise? Way all the excitement?' he said. 'We invited you to hear your opinions. Now you may go home.' "

That night, troops came from a nearby post, dragged the old man off and killed him. Next day people from 20 villages met to honor the old man. The tribespeople took a pledge that they would carry on the fight as the old man had done and it was agreed that only when there is no more forest and the brooks have dried up will the Rhade people allow themselves to be concentrated. But some of the villages near B. M. Thout were fenced around and turned into strategic hamlets. "Though they could fence in our villages, they could not fence in our hearts," the elder concluded. "They belong to the revolution."

THE PROGRAM IS EXPANDED

The Army Account (pg 25-30)

With the decision to expand the program, half of a Special Forces A detachment (seven members of Detachment A-35 of the 1st Special Forces Group) and ten members of the Vietnamese Special Forces (Rhade and Jarai), with a Vietnamese detachment commander, were introduced to assist in training village defenders and the full-time strike force. The composition of the Vietnamese Special Forces at Buon Enao fluctuated from time to time but was always at least 50 percent Montagnard. A program for the training of village medics and others to work in civil affairs projects intended to replace the discontinued government programs was also initiated. With the assistance of the U.S. Special Forces and Vietnamese Special Forces troops who had been introduced in December 1961, and a twelve-man U.S. Special Forces A detachment deployed in February 1962, all forty villages in the proposed expansion were incorporated into the program by the middle of April.

Recruits for both village defenders and the local security force were obtained through local village leaders. Before a village could be accepted as a part of the development program, the village chief was required to affirm that everyone in the village would participate in the program and that a sufficient number of people would volunteer for training to provide adequate protection for the village. The program was so popular with the Rhade that they began recruiting among themselves. One of the seven members of Detachment A-35 had this to say about how the Rhade received the program initially: "Within the first week, they [the Rhade] were lining up at the front gate to get into the program. This kicked off the recruiting program, and we didn't have to do much recruiting. The word went pretty fast from village to village." Part of the project's popularity undoubtedly stemmed from the fact that the Montagnards could have their weapons back. In the late 1950s all weapons, including the crossbow, had been denied to them by the government as reprisal for Viet Cong depredations and only bamboo spears were allowed until the second week in December 1961, when the government finally gave permission to train and arm the village defenders and strike forces. The strike force would maintain itself in a camp, while the village defenders would return to their homes after receiving training and arms.

The American and Vietnamese officials were acutely aware of the opportunity for Viet Cong infiltration and developed control measures to be followed by each village before it could be accepted for the Village Self-Defense Program. The village chief had to certify that everyone in the village was loyal to the government and had to reveal any known Viet Cong agents or sympathizers. Recruits vouched for the people nearest them in line when they came for training. These methods exposed five or six Viet Cong agents in each village and these were turned over to the Vietnamese and Rhade leaders for rehabilitation.

Cadres of Rhade trained by the Vietnamese Special Forces were responsible for training both local security (strike) forces and village defenders, with Special Forces troops acting as advisers to the cadres but having no active role as instructors. Villagers were brought into the center and trained in village units with the weapons they were to use, M1 and M3 carbines. Emphasis was placed on marksmanship, patrolling, ambush, counterambush, and swift response to enemy attacks. While members of a village were being trained, their village was occupied and protected by local security troops. Since no official table of organization and equipment existed, these strike force units were developed in accordance with the manpower available and the estimated needs of the area. Their basic element was the squad of eight to fourteen men, capable of acting as a separate patrol.

Activities within the operational area established in co-ordination with the province chief and Vietnam Army units in the vicinity consisted of small local security patrols, ambushes, village defender patrols, local intelligence nets, and an alert system in which local men, women, and children reported suspicious movement in the area. In some cases, U.S. Special Forces troops accompanied strike force patrols, but both Vietnamese and American policy prohibited U.S. units or individual American soldiers from commanding any Vietnamese troops.

All villages were lightly fortified, with evacuation the primary defensive measure and some use of family shelters for women and children. Strike force troops remained on the alert in the base center at Buon Enao to serve as a reaction force, and the villages maintained a mutually supporting defensive system wherein village defenders rushed to each other's assistance. The system was not limited to Rhade villages in the area but included Vietnamese villages as well.

Logistical support was provided directly by the logistical agencies of the U.S. Mission outside Vietnamese and U.S. Army supply channels. U.S. Special Forces served as the vehicle for providing this support at village level, although U.S. participation was indirect in that distribution of weapons and pay of troops was accomplished through local leaders.

In the field of civic assistance, the Village Self-Defense Program provided community development along with military security. Two six-man Montagnard extension service teams were organized to give the villagers training in the use of simple tools, methods of planting, care of crops, and blacksmithing. Village defender and strike force medics conducted clinics, sometimes moving into new villages and thus expanding the project. The civic assistance program received strong popular support from the Rhade.

The establishment of village defense systems in the forty villages surrounding Buon Enao attracted wide attention in other Rhade settlements, and the program expanded rapidly into the rest of Darlac Province. New centers similar to Buon Enao were established at Buon Ho, Buon Krong, Ea Ana, Lac Tien, and Buon Tah. From these bases the program grew, and by August 1962 the area under development encompassed 200 villages. Additional U.S. and Vietnamese Special Forces detachments were introduced. During the height of the expansion, five U.S. Special Forces A detachments, without counterpart Vietnamese detachments in some instances, were participating.

The Buon Enao program was considered a resounding success. Village defenders and strike forces accepted the training and weapons enthusiastically and became strongly motivated to oppose the Viet Cong, against whom they fought well. Largely because of the presence of these forces, the government toward the end of 1962 declared Darlac Province secure. At this time plans were being formulated to turn the program over to the Darlac Province chief and to extend the effort to other tribal groups, principally, the Jarai and the Mnong.

Burchett's Account (pg 159 - 162)

Life on the Reservation

The incident with I Bru took place at the end of 1961 and by February 1962 a partial economic blockade had been clamped down, with the stopping of salt supplies as the first step. Local officials ordered the tribespeople to halt rice-growing and cultivate jute instead, the Americans could supply rice more cheaply. About this time, according to Ybih Aleo, the Diemists startd planting "Gibbs" and "fountain pen" bombs in the minority villages, apparently as a reprisal for the traps with which the tribespeople were defending their homes and cultivation patches. The first was a tiny flat pressure min, about the size and shape of Gibbs' toothpowder tins. The second were shaped like Parker fountain pens. Raiding parties, which found hamlets emptyh when they arrived, would conceal Gibbs bombs everywhere, under a bed or table or a cooking pot or the bamboo strips which served as a floor in the tribespeople's huts. The "fountain pen" bombs were strewn around in the grass and a child picking one up would have his or her hands blown off. "After an enemy raid and the people returned to their homes, there were explosions, cries and groans until lat at night," Ybih Aleo said. …

Tran Dinh Minh [a Vietnamese who lived amongst the local tribespeople for 14 years, working for the Viet Minh against the French and now with the NLF] told me that during that period many of the younger men came to their base are and enlisted in the [NLF] forces. … "The struggle became difficult; once they had fenced in the villages, the Diemists then started setting up military posts to 'protect' them. We were not prepared at that time to lead the tribespeople in a general armed struggle. THey would have been exposed then to merciless reprisals from which we could offer no protection. Unlike most minority areas, there were no mountains to retire to [amongst the highlands] and the enemy's military strength there was many times greater than ours. We concentrated on political consolidation."

Life for the tribespeople gradually took on the pattern of that of the Red Indians in the "reservations" the Americans devised for those that survived the wholesale massacres of a century ago. As they were only allowed to move out from their enclosed villages in daylight, it was useless trying to work their ray [fields] and in fact they were only permitted to work land within a radius of one kilometer of the village. Normally the tribespeople leave the village in time to get in a full day's work at the ray between sunrise and sunset. The new regime was imposed to prevent contacts with the "Viet Cong" in the forests. There was no place to keep cattle within the barbed wire perimeter, so these were abandoned to the tigers. … they were subjected to the indignity of being searched as they left and entered the stockades. Hunting was finished; what could you hope to hunt within a kilometer of the village?

The parallel with the American Indians is too painfully obvious. The Diemists had started the old-style extermination campaign—and now the reservations for the latter stage. With tribal lands gone, hunting finished, custom's trampled on, their way of life turned upside down, they would die out anyway! But the tribespeople are no so resigned to their fate. As the tribal elder, mentioned earlier expressed it: "What you would see of our life if you could come to our village now, would be like ash. But underneath the ash are glowing coals. We await the day when the wind will come and blow away the ash and fan the coals into life."

Control in the stockades is exercised in daytime by Rhade nationals, selected long ago and trained in the Phillipines and introduced as representatives of the "new" religion and the "new" Americans. …

After a major effort by the Diemist regime in 1962, the area immediately surrounding B. M. Thuot, including the "agricultural settlements," wa brought back under Saigon's nominal control, but is was obvious from all I could see and hear, that the "glowing coal" situation was the real one.