Viet Nam - Two renditions of an attack

The attack was a significant escalation—both sides agree it was a major challenge to the army of the Diem government of South Vietnam. It was in January, 1960, on an old French fortress, Tua Hai, used as regimental headquarters of the Diem government's army in Tay Ninh province, northeast of Saigon.

Here is an incidental report, written in 1961, in an article on the challenges to the Diem government of South Vietnam, written by the American reporter, Stanley Karnow:

The current Communist offensive against South Vietnam began to build up as early as September, 1959. Communist guerrillas opened their operations with teams of fifty or more, soon increasing to company strength of a hundred—their largest groups since they fought the French. They had French, British, and American weapons hidden since wartime days; newer arms—some of Czech or Chinese origin—and fresh recruits were brought in from the north.

The first big push came last January. One night, attacking in company force, the Communists raided a regimental headquarters at Tay Ninh, northwest of Saigon, and killed thirty-four Vietnamese soldiers sleeping off their Chinese-style New Year's celebration. Soon they were fanning out through the southern delta, hitting army posts, ambushing troops, terrorizing local village chiefs. It is no longer safe to travel without escort in many parts of the country, and the important commercial highway between Saigon and Phnompenh is often closed. ( Stanley Karnow, The Reporter, Jan 19, 1961. In Reporting Vietnam, Library of America, p6)

Here is an account written in 1965 in a book about the guerrilla war, written by the Australian journalist. The below are all quotes from interviews with the man who commanded the attack

"The 'line' up till the end of 1959 had been exclusively a legal, political, non-violent form of struggle, but faced with the wholesale wiping out of all former resistance [to the French] cadres, it changed at the end of 1959 to permit the use of arms but in self-defense only.

"We decided to make the attack just prior to the Lunar year. The enemy's [the Diem government] terrorist campaign had reached its climax in the previous week. The Tua Hai regiment had just returned from a big military campaign in which hundreds of peasants in the Tay Ninh region had been massacred. … The biggest operation was launched at the end of January, not only to round up any former resistance members… but to grab up young able-bodied young men for their armed forces… [they] pillaged their homes, stealing their food. … People were demoralized, but underneath they were boiling with pent-up fury.

"We could not count on any outside force coming to the rescue. We had to stand up or be wiped out. … We got together 260 men—former resistance cadres, young men who had fled the press-gangs, some deserters from the Diemist army who had a few precious guns and some remnants from the armed religious sects. … Altogether we had 170 firearms, most of them archaic and with a strictly limited number of cartridges. … Apart from our fighting force, we also organized another 500 people from remote villages to arrive towards the end to carry our booty and any casualties. …"

[In a carefully designed attack, they took the fortress and carried away weapons and amunition.]

"There were arms everywhere, unopened cases of new weapons… The maximum we could carry were about 1,000 arms, including 800 rifles and a good selection of automatic weapons. … We kept enough arms for the battalion we set up immediately as a result of the battle, others were distributed to all other provinces, where they were most needed. They enemy's repressive machine started to disintegrate. With even a few arms in their hands, the people started moving everywhere and enemy prestige suffered a deadly blow. … A completely new stage in the struggle was ushered in. (Wilfred Burchett, Vietnam. Inside Story of the Guerrilla War, 1965. 116-117)