In the first chapter, Luce and Sommer give background on why they wrote this book. The war at first made their work more difficult by restricting some movement, making resources more difficult, and via the corrupt Saigon government, making their projects unpredictable. However, their difficulties changed form as the Vietnamese began to see all Americans as suspicious or tied with unpopular wielding of US power. Finally, the volunteers themselves began to see their work as assisting the American war effort, unable, in the end, to be seen as true aid to the people they were there to serve. Finally, many came to the conclusion that the best way to serve the local people was to work in the US to find an end to the war. Below are quotes from the chapter, outlining these developments.
The accelerating tempo of the war and the increasing hostility of many Vietnamese people toward Americans began to affect the work of IVS seriously after mid-1965. In the early years … Americans at home, or even in Saigon, were often amazed at the extent to which volunteers could carry on work even when newspaper headlines were dwelling on the battle that seemed to rage everywhere.… (p11)
With escalation by both sides and the introduction of large American troop units in 1965, the role of the volunteer became gravely compromised. … In 1958, villagers had invited us in for tea and asked about life in the United States … Upon seeing us in 1967, these same villagers got up from their front steps, walked into their homes, and closed the door. (p12)
At the same time that the Vietnamese turned away from us, the U.S. Mission wanted us to cooperate more closely with American officials. But such associations made our work more difficult. The massive and increasingly resented American presence made it nearly impossible for volunteers to preserve a separate identity in the eye of the Vietnamese. (p12)
Since we could speak Vietnamese and had friends at almost every level of the society, our participation on "the American team," as it came to be known, was widely solicited. … Our associations with American power made us less appealing to Vietnamese who had learned to mistrust it and to fear it. In a 1966 efficiency move, the Office of Civilian Operation (OCO) was formed by the American Mission to incorporate all branches of the provincial civilian effort: JUSPAO (information and psychological warfare), USAID (economic assistance), and the CIA (intelligence). This marriage of the information service, the economic aid program, and secret intelligence activities made many Vietnamese suspect even more any American who associated with "official" Americans. (p13) When OCO was later combined with the military into MACCORDS, primarily for the purposes of the pacification program, the move alienated the Vietnamese still further from the Americans. (p14)
It was an accumulation of all these problems and dilemmas that served as the backdrop to a critical meeting of IVS members held in Saigon over the Fourth of July weekend, 1967. The question in everybody's mind was whether we should continue our work in Viet Nam. (p14)
"The Vietnamese make no distinction between your organization and the U.S. government, " [A Vietnamese member of the board of advisors] went on. "This is too complicated, and, as a result, U.S. policy casts a direct shadow on whatever you do or say. … I advise you to tell the American people what your government is doing in Viet Nam, with the hope that a change will bring a better plan that the present one." (p17). [Another board member advised,] "if you really want to help the Vietnamese people, then you must help us find peace." "Go back to America and explain what the war had done to our people. Peace can only be found in America." (p18)
[In a letter to President Johnson, forty-nine volunteers said] "to stay in Vietnam and remain silent is to fail to respond to the first need of the Vietnamese people--peace." (p19) "Four of us determined to resign so we could speak out freely on what we saw and felt." (p20)
Ambassador Bunker agreed to see us. He was cordial, but termed our handling of the resignation and the letter "unethical and discourteous." He showed little interest in discussing the reasons for our actions. (p20)
On our return to the United States, we found that members of Congress were concerned and that they wanted to discuss with us the problems of Viet Nam. … They were concerned about how the United States could get out of Viet Nam in a responsible way…(p21)
After the interview [with an advisor to President Johnson], it was made clear that to discuss the widespread resentment against the Saigon government, the growing anti-American feelings in Viet Nam, the effects of defoliants on the crops of Vietnamese farmers, and the problems caused by the creation of refugees would be wasting the President's time. The President's adviser was interested in providing the President with information that would support present administration policy. (p21)
We learned that [Vice-President Humphrey] had called our resignation "one of the greatest disservices to the American effort in Viet Nam." (p21)
Secretary of State Dean Rusk felt obliged to say that our statements reflected the opinions of only a small minority of Vietnamese, that the vast majority were all for continuing the military effort. Assistant Secretary of State William Bundy expressed the view that those of us who had resigned from IVS could not see the Viet Nam issue in its proper perspective. (p22)
Lower echelon officers, if they were willing to speak out at all, admitted sympathy with our position and said they too had been ignored higher up. (p22)
The most appreciative reaction came from the Vietnamese themselves. … "You have said what we have wanted to say, yet would be put in jail for saying." (p22)
This, then, is our purpose: to tell the story of Viet Nam to our fellow Americans. (p23)
